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SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY AND THE
SEC'S PROXY RULES: IN THE BOARDROOM
Marilyn B. Cane *
Stacey L. Silva **
I. INTRODUCTION

Although shareholder activism has progressed in recent years, the 2008
The legal
financial crisis confirms the need for further changes.'
structure underpinning contemporary American corporate governance
has failed shareholders. "[T]here are still problems in exercising basic
shareholder rights in many U.S. listed companies, because shareholders
often have limited influence over the election of their board members"
wrote the chief of the investment arm of2Norway's central bank in a
letter to S.E.C. Chairman Christopher Cox.
Two prominent examples, Enron and Lehman Brothers, highlight
the status quo's problems. The failure of Enron's board of directors to
safeguard shareholders contributed to the company's collapse. In its
2002 report, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
concluded that Enron's board allowed the company:
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1. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1784, 1784-85 (2006).
2. Comment Letter from Knut Kjer, CEO, Norges Bank Inv. Mgmt., et al., to
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-499.pdf (commenting on Shareholder
Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161) [hereinafter Kjer Letter]; see
generally Norges Bank, About NBIM available at http://www.norges-bank.no/
69632.aspx; c.f Muhammad Cohen, Campaign Outsider: Money
templates/article
Issue Needs a Champion, ASIA TIMES, May 21, 2008, available at http://www.atimes
.com/atimes/GlobalEconomy/JE21DjO9.html (arguing "in modern corporate practice,
board of director electors are a sham, reminiscent of Soviet Union-style voting without
a whiff of real democracy").
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[T]o engage in high risk accounting, inappropriate conflict of interest
transactions, extensive undisclosed off-the-books activities, and
excessive executive compensation. The board [also] witnessed numerous indications of questionable practices by Enron management
over several years, but chose to ignore them to the 3detriment of
Enron shareholders, employees and business associates.

There was reason to be optimistic about governance changes in
Enron's aftermath. 4 The current financial crisis, however, has revealed
the extent to which corporate boards of directors continue to fail shareholders. Lehman Brothers' board of directors took a "leisurely approach
to overseeing the risk decisions and standards" which led to the firm's
September 2008 bankruptcy. Moreover, Lehman's board was "content
with a governance structure that concentrated power effectively in the
hands of the CEO" and "apparently [saw] no need for a change in its
own governance, or that of top management either. It took a bet that its
approach would work and it lost big time. . .5 These episodes illustrate
the dangers of inattentive and enfeebled boards of directors.
A director owes a fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders to
oversee corporate management. 6 Accordingly, shareholders should play
the leading role in selecting a board charged with representing their
interests. Shareholders elect the board of directors through a proxy card
which allows investors to vote without actually attending the shareholder meeting. 7 In the rare situations where the current board members
have not re-nominated themselves, the only nominees found on the
proxy ballot are those chosen by the company's management. 8 If a
shareholder wants to suggest a nominee for the board election, the shareholder must cover the expense of complying with complex SEC

3. S. REP.No. 107-70, at 3 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
(Sarbanes-Oxley) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amendment in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.)
5. Finlay on Governance, Questionfor Lehman Brothers Board: Why Are You
Still There? (June 10, 2008), http://www.finlayongovemance.com/?p=485. Members of
the Board of Directors were paid fees ranging from $325,000 to $397,000. Id.
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,93 VA. L.
REv. 675, 679 (2007).
7. See Cohen, supranote 2.
8. See id.; see also Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. to Propose Change in Election of
Boards, N.Y. Times, May 19, 2009, at B3 (stating that even with heavy opposition, the
candidate normally wins).
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regulations and mail separate ballots to shareholders. 9
This process undermines shareholder democracy. In reality, the
nomination process for the board of directors is controlled by management. The interests of a director who owes their position on the board to
the corporation's executives are in conflict with the company's shareholders.' 0 The situation is exacerbated when the company's chief executive officer is an influential board member or chairperson."' A nomination usually results in election since board elections are often

uncontested. 12
One prominent shareholder rights advocacy group, the American
Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees (AFSCME), urged
shareholders to press companies to adopt bylaws which would grant
shareholders' board nominees direct access to the proxy ballot. Shareholders nominees would reach all of the company's shareholders
without imposing on the shareholder the costs of a potentially expensive
proxy battle.' 3 AFSCME also challenged the interpretation of SEC Rule
14a-8(i)(8), 14 which states that a company may exclude a shareholder
proposal in the company's proxy statement "[i]f the proposal relates to a
nomination or an election for membership on the company's board of
directors or analogous governing body or a procedure for such nomination or election", in court. 5 The case, American Federationof State,
County & Municipal Employees v. American International Group
("AFSCME"), 16 reached the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2006.
The court held 14a-8(i)(8) did not preclude the adoption of AFSCME's

proposed bylaws. 17
As a result of AFSCME, the SEC attempted to clarify the interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) by proposing two alternative approaches to
proxy access for shareholder nominations of directors in 2007. 8 The

9. See Cohen, supra note 2.
10. See id.
11.
See id.
12. See id; see also Labaton, supra note 8.
13. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Symposium, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing
Shareholder Power Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L.
REv. 475,485 (2008).
14. See id.

15.
16.
Group,
17.
18.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2008).
See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006).
See infra text accompanying n.35.
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment

244

FORDHAMJOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W

Vol. XV

first was a procedure which allowed for qualified shareholders to access
the company proxy material for nominating directors to the board
through bylaw amendments.' 9 The second procedure would close shareholder access to the company proxy material for nominating directors to
the board through bylaw amendments. 20 In what some critics labeled a
political move, the SEC voted to close proxy access for shareholder
nominations of directors by adopting the Non-Access Proposal. 2' In
May 2009, the SEC voted to propose rule amendments which "would
provide shareholders with a meaningful ability to exercise their state law
rights to nominate the directors of the companies that they own." 22 "If
adopted, the proposal would open the door to the most significant
change in decades to the role played by investors in governing publicly
23
traded companies.,
Part II of this Article reviews the historical and recent interpretation
of SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8) and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
AFSCME decision. Part III evaluates the Access Proposal the SEC rejected in 2007. Part IV evaluates the 2007 SEC Non-Access Proposal,
and the proposal's effect on shareholder rights. Part V discusses why
neither of the SEC's 2007 adequately addresses the issue of shareholder
rights, reviews the 2009 SEC proposal, and sets forth a workable
solution.

Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466 (Aug. 3, 2007); Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488 (Aug. 3, 2007).
19.
See Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,466.
20. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. at
43,488.
21.
See Ian Katz & Jesse Westbrook, Bank ofAmerica, GM May Win SEC Vote on
Board Picks (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 28, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.con/
apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aWBtkl5t47mY&refer=news.
22.
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule
Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm [hereinafter
SEC Press Release].
23.
Labaton, supra note 8.
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II. SEC RULE 14A-8(I)(8)
Under the SEC's proxy rules for U.S. companies:
If a shareholder seeking to submit a proposal meets certain eligibility
and procedural requirements, the corporation is required to include
the proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its
form of proxy, unless the corporation can prove to the SEC that a
based on one of thirteen grounds
given proposal may be excluded
24
enumerated in the regulations.

"[T]he rule requires a company to include the text of a shareholder
proposal in the proxy statement provided to shareholders by management and to give shareholders the opportunity to vote for the proposal on
management's proxy card."' 25 One of the thirteen grounds a company
can use to exclude shareholder proposals concerning the election of
directors under its Rule 14a-8(i)(8) is where the proposal "relates to an
election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body."26
A. AFSCME v. AIG
AFSCME submitted a proposal ("Proposal") to include its board
nominees in American International Group's (AIG) 2005 proxy
statement.2' The Proposal sought to amend the bylaws by requiring AIG
to include in its proxy statement the name, along with certain disclosures
and statements, of any person nominated for election to the board by a
stockholder who beneficially owns 3% or more of AIG's outstanding
stock.28 In response, AIG filed a letter with SEC's Division of Corporate Finance (Division) stating the Proposal "relates to an election"
and sought to exclude the Proposal from its proxy statement. 29 The

24. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(l)-(13) (2008)).
25. Brief of Harvard Law School Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants, AFSCME v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 052825).
26. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 125 (emphasis added) (quoting Rule 14a-8(i)(8)).
27. Id. at 123.
28. Id. at 124.
29. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Division, in a 'no-action' letter, stated that it would not recommend
enforcement action against AIG for excluding the Proposal.30 AFSCME
then requested that the Commission itself review the Division's
position. 3' The Commission resolved not to review the Division's noaction position under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).32 AFSCME, dissatisfied with the
Commission's decision, took the issue to federal district court. After the
district court denied AFSCME's33 motion, AFSCME appealed to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The appellate court held that AIG could not rely on Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
to exclude a shareholder proposal seeking to amend the company's
bylaws to establish a procedure under which the company would be
required to include shareholder nominees for director in the company's
proxy materials at future meetings.3 4 In a unanimous opinion written by
Judge Richard C. Wesley, the Second Circuit held, referencing SEC
Rule 14a-8(i)(8), "a shareholder proposal that seeks to amend the
corporate bylaws to establish a procedure by which shareholdernominated candidates may be included on the corporate ballot does not
relate to an election within the meaning of the Rule and therefore cannot
35
be excluded from corporate proxy materials under that regulation.,
The holding was based on the Court's view of the initial interpretation of
the SEC staff going back to 1976 when the present language of what is
now Rule 14a-8(i)(8) was adopted.36 That interpretation in the court's
view limited the exclusion to shareholder proposals pertaining to a
specific election contest and not to election procedures.3 7
The Court recognized that, commencing in 1990, the Division
"began applying a different interpretation, although at first in an ad hoc
and inconsistent manner.",3 8 The Court stated "[w]e believe that an

30. Id. See also Am. Int'l Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 372266
(Feb. 4, 2005).
31.
Brief of Appellee-Respondent, AFSCME v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d
121 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-2825).
32. Id.
33. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 124 (referring to AFSCME v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 361
F. Supp. 2d 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
34. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2006).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 126-28.
37. Id.
38. Id.at 123.
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agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation made at the time the

regulation was implemented or revised should control unless that agency
has offered sufficient reasons for its changed interpretation. 3 9 The
Court concluded: "For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment

of the district court and remand the case for entry of judgment in favor
AFSCME. ' 4 °

"The effect of the AFSCME decision was to permit both the bylaw
proposal and, had the bylaw been adopted, subsequent election contests

conducted under it, to be included in the company's proxy materials, but
without compliance 4 with the disclosure requirements of Rule 14a-12
proxy solicitations.",

1

B. HistoricalInterpretation

When the SEC amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8) in 1976, the SEC stated
that "with respect to corporate elections, Rule 14a-8 is not the proper

means for conducting campaigns or effecting reforms in elections of that
nature [i.e., 'corporate, political or other elections to office'], since other
proxy rules, including Rule 14a- 11, are applicable thereto. 42 After the
1976 amended Rule was adopted, the SEC stated it did not intend to

"expand the scope of existing exclusions to cover proposals dealing with
43
matters previously held not excludable by the Commission.,
The AFSCME Court interpreted the 1976 SEC statements to support
the position that:
[T]he election exclusion is limited to shareholder proposals used to
oppose solicitations dealing with an identified board seat in an
upcoming election and rejects the somewhat broader interpretation
that the election exclusion applies to shareholder proposals that

39. Id.
40. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2006).
41.
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,469 (Aug. 3, 2007).
42. AFSCAIE, 462 F.3d at 126-27 (quoting Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8,
41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,985 (proposed July 7, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R § 240.14a-8)
(emphasis omitted)).
43. Id. at 127 (quoting Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security
Holders, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,998 (Nov. 22, 1976) (codified at 17 C.F.R § 240.14a8)).
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would 44institute procedures making such election contests more
likely.

In contrast, the SEC found its current interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
to be consistent with the 1976 statements.45
This is not the first time the SEC has addressed direct access to
proxy statements. 46 In 1990, the Commission "not[ed] the difficulty
experienced by shareholders in gaining a new voice in determining the
composition of the board of directors" but still choose not to pursue a
remedy for shareholder access. 47 A never adopted 2003 proposal sought
to give shareholders with five percent ownership a voice in making
director nominations.4 8
C. Recent Interpretation
The SEC, interpreting Rule 14a-8(i)(8), stated that:
A proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) if it would
result in an immediate election contest (e.g., by making a director
nomination for a particular meeting) or would set up a process for
shareholders to conduct an election contest in the future by requiring
the company to include shareholder director nominees
in the
49
company's proxy materials for subsequent meetings.

The SEC further stated that "a proposal would result in a contested
election if it is a means either to campaign for or against a director
nominee or to require a company to include shareholder-nominated
candidates in the company's proxy materials."50 AIG supported the
44. Id.at 128.
45. See Statement ConcerningBylaw Proposalsto Establish DirectorNomination
Procedures: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,

110th Cong. (Nov. 14, 2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts 11407
cc.htm) [hereinafter Cox Statement].
46. See Gordon, supra note 13, at 483-84.
47. Cox Statement, supra note 45.
48. Gordon, supra note 13, at 481 (noting "the effect [of shareholder constrains]
has been to rule out a low-cost mechanism for shareholder insurgent to reach fellow
shareholders in a director election.").
49. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2006).
50. Id. at 126.
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SEC interpretation that the 1976 statements authorize the exclusion of
proposals that would result in both an immediate election contest and
election reform "being used for the purpose of electioneering or
fostering election contests.""1
The AFSCME Court, however, stated that the SEC began apply a
different interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8) in 1990.52 In their Amicus
Brief, several Harvard Law professors argued that "[t]here is no basis in

the language of the Rule or otherwise for importing a requirement that a
proposal not make a contested election more likely."5 3 AFSCME
argued the broad interpretation of the SEC to be inconsistent with "the
legislative purposes of the proxy rules and shareholder proposals. 54

III. ACCESS PROPOSAL
In the Access Proposal, Rule 14a-8 would be amended to require

companies to include in their proxy materials shareholder proposals for
bylaw amendment that would establish procedures for nominating
candidates to the board of directors.55

The Access Proposal initially

seemed to be a success for the campaign for shareholder rights. Upon
further review, some commentators observed "the regulatory approach

taken in the Proposal [was] unnecessarily complex and in some aspects
poorly aligned with shareholder interests.

56

Under the Access Proposal:
A proposal may be submitted by a shareholder (or group of
shareholders) that is eligible to and has filed a Schedule 13G that
includes specified public disclosures regarding its background and its

51.
Brief of Appellee-Respondent, supra note 31, at 33. The SEC submitted an
amicus brief supporting AIG's argument that shareholder proposals that "would result
in contested elections" could be excluded. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 126.
52. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 123.
53. Brief of Harvard Law School Professors as Amici Curiae, supra note 25, at 5.
54. Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 28-29, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun.
Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2006) (No. 05-2825).
55. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,466 (Aug. 3, 2007).
56.
Comment Letter from John C. Wilcox, Sr. Vice President, Head of Corporate
Governance & Hye-Wo Choi, Vice President and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Corporate
Governance, Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of Am., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary,
SEC (Sept. 20, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607199.pdf (commenting on Shareholder Proposals in Release No. 34-56160 and 3456161) [hereinafter Wilcox Letter].
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interactions with the company, that has continuously held more than
5% of the company's securities for at least one year, and
that
57
otherwise satisfies the procedural requirements of Rule 14a-8.

A proposal could only be submitted by shareholders or groups of
shareholders who held 5% of the company's voting stock.5 8 Supporters
state the 5% requirement is an eligibility requirement for filing a
Schedule 13G which is a "well-understood system of disclosure [that]
should reduce compliance costs for companies and shareholders."5 9 The
Access Proposal's critics objected to the 5% ownership requirement and
stated that access provided was illusory. 60 The Council of Institutional
Investors stated that its preliminary research "indicate[d] that even if the
ten largest public pension funds were to aggregate their holdings of a
single public company's securities, those funds combined would likely
be unable to clear the five percent hurdle.",6' The 5% holding requirement alone would most likely result in "almost no shareholder proposals.

62

Additionally, eligible 5% shares must be "continuously held for at
least one year as of the date of submitting the proposal" for the purpose
of "ensuring that proposals are made by shareholders with a significant
long-term stake in the company., 63 Critics found the one year requirement unnecessary because "[t]he proposal already requires that shareholders proposing such a bylaw certify that they did not acquire or hold
the stock for the purpose of effecting change or influencing control of
the company." 64 Further, "any consolidation of holdings over a one-

57.
Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,470.
58.
Id. at 43,472.
59. Id. at 43,469.
60. See Comment Letter from Jeff Mahoney, General Counsel, Council of
Institutional Investors, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on
Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161 (Aug. 24, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-31.pdf (commenting on
Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161).
61.
Id. at3.
62.
Kjer Letter, supra note 2.
63. Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,472 (Aug. 3, 2007).
64. Comment Letter from Carl Levin, Member of Congress, to Christopher Cox,
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-329.pdf (commenting on Shareholder Proposals in
Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161) [hereinafter Levin Letter].

2009

SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY

year horizon may constitute severe administrative and compliance
difficulties for some investors who might under other circumstances be
interested in sponsoring a proposal. 65
The Access Proposal's disclosure requirements are extensive. In
addition to the typical Schedule 13G disclosures, new disclosure rules
would require shareholders to disclose "[t]he shareholder proponent's
relationship with the company" and "[a]dditional relevant background
information. 66 The relationship between the shareholder proponent and
the company would require disclosure by the shareholder of direct and
indirect communication with the company, description of any action
sought in those communications, to whom the communications were
made, whether there was reference to a possible proposal in the
communications, and the company's response.67

The Access Proposal would also require shareholders to disclose
their relationship with the company including employment, collective
bargaining or consulting arrangements; any pending or threatened
litigation with the company; and any other material relationship between
the company and shareholder proponent. 68 The Access Proposal's supporters argue that these additional disclosures are useful for company
shareholders when voting for or against a proposal.69
Critics argued the disclosure requirements "go far beyond anything
shareholders would find useful in voting on a proxy access proposal"
and in some respects exceed the "disclosure require[ments] of nominating shareholders in a proxy contest or of shareholders.

.

. [who] indi-

cate that they intend to engage in actives that may result in a change of
control of the company." 7 ° SEC Commissioner Annette L. Nazareth
stated, "[t]he disclosure would have been more burdensome than in the
takeover context."'" Critics concluded that the additional disclosure
65. Kjer Letter, supra note 2.
66. Shareholder Proposals, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,471.
67. See id. at 43,472-73.
68.
See id.at 43,472.
69.
See id. at 43,471.
70. Comment Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, International President, Am. Fed'n
of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 3456161 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s7170765.pdf [hereinafter McEntee Letter].
71.
Annette L. Nazareth, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Speech Before the U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (Nov. 28, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/
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with the dialogue berequirements are unwarranted and would interfere
72
tween shareholder proponents and companies.
Some critics argue the need for shareholder access to the proxy
statement has been replaced by electronic shareholder forums.73 Others
counter that electronic forums act as "an enhancement to rather than a

replacement for more formal channels of communication between
shareholders and companies."' 74 Critics claim the expansion of shareholder access would result in "diminish[ed] rights of other stockholders,
who are entitled to the assurance that company funds and management
time and focus are employed . . . in the best interest of all stockholders. 75 One stockholder, as opposed to the board of directors, does

not have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of all stockholders.76
IV. NON-ACCESS PROPOSAL

In the Non-Access Proposal, the SEC proposed to clarify Rule 14a-

8 consistent with its interpretations that any proposal which could result
in an election contest may be excluded from a company's proxy
material. 77 The exclusion in Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would be revised to read:
"If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on

the company's board of directors or analogous governing body or a
procedure for such nomination or election., 78 The Non-Access Proposal
further clarified that "procedure" referenced any "procedures that would
result in a contested election, either in the year in which the proposal is

spchI 12807aln.htm) [hereinafter Nazareth Speech].
72. See McEntee Letter, supra note 70.
73. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 13, at 487.
74.
Comment Letter from Michelle Edkins, Acting Chairman, ICGN S'holder
Rights Comm., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, on Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161 (Oct. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-462.pdf [hereinafter Edkins Letter].
Comment Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Committee Chair, Comm. on Fed. Reg.
75.
of Sec. of A.B.A., Sec. of Bus. L., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, on Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161 (Oct. 2,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-126.pdf [hereinafter Higgins Letter].
See id.
76.
77. See Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56160, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,468 (Aug. 3, 2007).
78. Id. at 43,487.
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submitted or in subsequent years..."79

The Non-Access Proposal was a direct response to the Second Circuit's decision in AFSCME. The AFSCME Court stated that "... if the
SEC determines that the interpretation of the election exclusion embodied in its 1976 Statement would result in a decrease in necessary disclosures or any other undesirable outcome, it can certainly change its
interpretation of the election exclusion, provided that it explains its
reasons for doing so. ''80 The SEC stated the Non-Access Proposal was a

means "to eliminate any uncertainty and confusion" and to ensure the
proper functioning of the election exclusion.8
The Non-Access Proposal's supporters claim that the Commission

should continue its long-standing interpretation of Rule 14a-8(i)(8). 2 A
new interpretation such as the Access Proposal is not timely or needed.83
Many supporters believe "that company proxy statements are not the
appropriate medium for shareholders to nominate directors., 8 4 The fear
is that allowing access would "increase the costs of director elections
and shift the cost of proposing nominees . . . to all shareholders. 85
79. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No.56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488,
43,492 (Aug. 3, 2007).
80. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees (AFSCME) v. Am. Int'l
Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2006).
81.
Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, 72 Fed. Reg. at
43,491.
82. See Higgins Letter, supra note 75. The Comment Letter from Keith F. Higgins
recommended the following as the amended text for Rule 14a-8(i)(8):
If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the
company's board of directors or analogous governing body, including, without
limitation, (i) by opposing the nomination for election, the election as a director, or
service for his or her full term of a current director or board nominee for election, (ii)
by directly or indirectly resulting in the ineligibility of any such person for such
nomination, election or service or (iii) by otherwise creating or establishing
procedures or practices that in the current or subsequent years apply to or may result
in a contested election of directors.
Id.
83. See id Supporters further state, current changes such as the use of the Internet
have provided shareholders with adequate means to conduct cost-effective director
nominations. See also Comment Letter from Anne M. Mulchy, Chairman & CEO,
Xerox Corp., and Chairman, Bus. Roundtable Corporate Governance Task Force, to
Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-77.pdf (commenting on Shareholder
Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161) [hereinafter Mulchy Letter].
84. Mulchy Letter, supra note 83.
85. Id. See also McEntee Letter, supra note 70. After the AFSCME ruling,
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Further, critics believe that allowing shareholder nominees on company
86
proxy materials would result in aper se contested election.
One criticism of the Non-Access Proposal is that it would
"sometimes prevent the exercise of fundamental state law rights. ' 87
Under state law, shareholders are granted the power to amend bylaws.8 "
"Given the key role of director elections under state law, it makes no
sense to treat proposals regarding shareholder access to the company
proxy statement for the purpose of nominating director candidates
differently from other kinds of proposals., 89 The result would be to
"nullify the existing right of investors to adopt director election procedures through shareowner proposals." 90
While some critics of the Non-Access Proposal question the need to
fully deny shareholders proxy access in the electoral process, 9' others
found it "would severely limit the ability of shareholders to influence the
composition of the board of directors and would.., be a retrograde step
at a time when there is increasing demand from shareholders for director
accountability., 92 Some critics worried that the Non-Access Proposal's
adoption would lead to a competitive disadvantage and "would only reinforce the growing belief amongst global investors that the US regulatory environment favors company insiders at the expense of outside

AFSCME received three proxy access proposals only one of which received majority
support. Id. The other two proposals received 45% and 43% of shares voted. Id.
86. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 56,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 27914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488,
43,491 (Aug. 3, 2007).
87. Nazareth Speech, supra note 71.
88. See Comment Letter from Lucian Bebchuk, Professor, Harvard Law School, et
al., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, (Oct. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s71707-119.pdf (thirty-nine professors commenting on Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161)
[hereinafter Bebchuk Letter].
89. McEntee Letter, supra note 70.
90. Comment Letter from Peter H. Mixon, General Counsel, California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Sept. 27,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-17-07/s7l707-38.pdf (commenting on Shareholder Proposals in Release No. 34-56161).
91. See Levin Letter, supra note 64.
92. Edkins Letter, supra note 74. The letter further stated that "[t]he right of shareholders to remove directors, who are after all their agents or fiduciaries, exists in most
markets outside the US." Id. While available, the right is rarely used, there is no evidence the right has been abused. Id.
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shareholders."
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93

V. WORKABLE SOLUTION
94
Ultimately, the Commission adopted the Non-Access Proposal

despite the opposition by the vast majority of Comment Letters written
to the SEC. 95 In response, former S.E.C. Chairman Arthur Levitt stated:
It's a sad day when the S.E.C., the investor's advocate, chooses to
gag the voices of those they are charged to protect. Not only do
shareholders deserve a say in who runs the companies they own, but
free and fair markets depend on this oversight. Fortunately I believe
that it is only a matter of time
96 before investors are given the
shareholder access they deserve.

"[B]oth [Access and Non-Access] proposals would produce unnecessary and undesirable impediments to shareholders' exercise of their
right under state law to initiate bylaw amendments concerning shareholder nomination of directors."9 7 The corporate law of many other
common-law countries allows shareholders "the right to place director
candidates on the corporate ballot.",98 The current proposal's less
restrictive approach is certainly more desirable than completely closing
shareholder access to the company proxy.
Under the 2009 proposed rule, the new Exchange Act Rule 14a- 11

would allow qualified shareholders to include a director nominee in
company proxy material unless prohibited by the company's
charter/bylaws or by state law. 99 The proposal provides graded share93. Comment Letter from Michael O'Sullivan, President, Australian Council of
Super-Investors, et al., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
(Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-445.pdf
(commenting on Shareholder Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161)
[hereinafter O'Sullivan Letter].
94. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
95. See Nazareth Speech, supra note 71. Over 34,000 comment letters were received in response to the Access Proposal and over 8,000 letters were received in response to the Non-Access Proposal. Id.
96.

Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Sends Investors to the Children's Table, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, at § 3.
97. Bebchuk Letter, supra note 88.
98.

Lucian A. Bebchuk, ShareholderRights and the DGCL, 26 DEL. LAWYER 16,

16 (Spring 2008).
99. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-9046; 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,031 (June 18, 2009).
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holder eligibility thresholds depending on the size of the company.' 0 0
To meet thresholds, shareholders would be allowed to aggregate
holdings. 10' Shareholders would have a one year holding requirement
and would be required to represent their intent of continued ownership
of their shares through the date of the annual meeting at which directors
are elected. 102 Additionally, shareholders must attest to their intentions;
the rule is not intended to facilitate shareholder seeking control of the
company or the board.' 0 3 The nominating shareholder would submit to
the company and file with the SEC a new Schedule 14N. 10 4 The
company proxy materials would include disclosure concerning the
nominating shareholder. 105
The proposed graded threshold requirements are refreshing when
compared to the Access Proposal's flat 5% ownership requirement. The
one year requirement is too restrictive especially considering the proposal already requires nominating shareholders to certify they are "not
seeking to change the control of the company."' 106 As of now, the
current proposal's disclosure requirements are unavailable for comparison to the Access Proposal's excessive and burdensome disclosure
requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
While some companies found allowing shareholder access to proxy
statements threatening,' °7 supporters argued that Rule 14a-8's purpose is
100. See id. at 29,035 (For large accelerated filers (worldwide market value of $700
million or more), the shareholder must own at least 1 percent of the voting security. For
accelerated filers (worldwide market value between $75 million and 700 million), the
shareholder must own at least 3 percent of the voting security. For non-accelerated
filers (worldwide market value less than $75 million), the shareholder must own at least
5 percent of the voting security.).
101.
See id.
102. See id.
103.
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,037.
104. See id. at 29,037. The new Schedule 14N would require shareholder disclosure
of "the amount and percentage of securities owned by the nominating shareholder or
group, the length of ownership of such securities, and the nominating shareholder's or
groups intent to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting ....
Id.
at 29,038.

105.

See id. at 29,037-38.

106.
107.

Id.
Shareholder Rights and Wrongs, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2007, at 80 ("The bosses
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"not to force change on a company, but to get the attention of its board
and senior management, promote dialogue and, when appropriate, conduct a shareholder referendum on issues of concern."' 10 8 Furthermore, in
a comment letter, the House Committee on Financial Services stated:
As a general matter, we are in favor of facilitating greater proxy
access for shareholders, but we appreciate concerns that director
nominations on a company's proxy not be used to achieve a change
of control of a company. We do not believe, however, that this
concern should be used as an excuse for companies that fear
shareholder participation to avoid any proposals and the resulting
discussions of appropriate mechanisms for access to the proxy by
longer-term shareholders on key corporate governance issues.
Neither should such concerns be used to justify restriction or
elimination of the ability of shareholders to include non-binding
proposals on a company's proxy.109

Similarly, Senator Carl Levin expressed the need to address
"inattentive and compliant boards of directors that fail to protect shareholder interests and too often place the interests of corporate management ahead of the interests of the corporation's owners."" 0 This is
especially troublesome because "the US legal and regulatory systems are
built on the presumption that directors effectively protect the interest of
shareholders." 1"
insist they are actually lobbying to protect the interests of shareholders as a whole
against minority shareholder activists, especially hedge funds, unions and campaigning,
single-issue investors. This is nonsense.").
108.
Wilcox Letter, supra note 56 (A group of Harvard Law School professors
argued "allowing companies to exclude the considered bylaw amendment and other
similar bylaw amendments would greatly undermine the Rule's policy goals and would
adversely affect our corporate governance system."); Comment Letter from Lucian
Bebchuk, Professor, Harvard Law School, et al., to Brian G. Cartwright, General
Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 2, 2006), availableat http://
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/Policy/48LawProfsSEC.pdf
(forty-eight law
professors commenting on interpretation of SEC Rule 14a-8).
109.
Comment Letter from Barney Frank, Member of Congress, et al., to
Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Oct. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-07/s71607-636.pdf (commenting on Shareholder
Proposals in Release Nos. 34-56160 and 34-56161).
110. Levin Letter, supra note 64, at 1 ("The intractable problem of excessive pay
unrelated to corporate performance - pay which is the sole responsibility of boards of
directors to establish and review - provides still more proof of the need to create new
incentives for meaningful boardroom oversight of management actions.").
111.
O'Sullivan Letter, supra note 93.
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The 2008 fmancial crisis only strengthens the argument for
shareholder democracy. "Shareholders have long pressed for a greater
role in nominating directors, reasoning that a director nominated by
investors would analyze issues with investor concerns in mind, would
represent those concerns in boardroom discussions, and would help
remind other board members that their paramount duty is to company
shareholders, not management." '" 12 Providing shareholders a greater influence in the board's composition would help in creating a functioning
system of checks and balances. 3
The results of the 2009 proposed rule amendments remain to be
seen. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated "[t]his proposal represents
nearly seven years of debate about whether the federal proxy rules
should support - or stand in the way of - shareholders exercising their
fundamental right to nominate directors."' 14

112.
113.
114.

Levin Letter, supra note 64.
See Kjer Letter, supra note 2.
SEC Press Release, supra note 22.

